A Brief Report

The Suspected Congress Election Rigging in South Korea

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Background Information

There was a Congress Election in South Korea last April. The S. Korean system gives people two options: they can vote either on the Election Day, a special holiday for voting (the last Congress Election Day was April 15, 2020) or on one of two Universal Early Voting (UEV) days (April 10th and 11th).¹

UEV is a uniquely Korean system. Thousands of UEV-only polling places are set up across the nation. One can visit any one of them, have his/her ID confirmed and receive an at-site-printed paper ballot. It shows election candidates according to his/her registered address (his/her election district). And each ballot has a unique identifier coded in QR.

UEV polling place workers put the voters in two different queues: 'in-district' (his/her address belongs to the local National Election Committee(NEC) branch's jurisdiction) or 'out-district' (his/her address does not belong to the local NEC branch's jurisdiction). In-district ballots are moved by the NEC workers to their branch office and stored for 5 to 6 days. Each out-district ballot is put in an envelope and 'supposedly' handed over to an Postal Service worker² and processed to its destination (each ballot's jurisdictional NEC branch office).

At the end of the Election Day, <u>all</u> the ballots are counted by BCM(Ballot Counting Machines). The current government upgraded a BCM's into a high-performance server-grade computer. It scans all the ballots and store the images in a USB, while it counts the poll at a very high speed. There is a

¹ There is also Absentee Voting for people serving the armed forces, living abroad, being hospitalized, serving prison term, or staying in ocean ships.

² The law mandates the Postal Service; in reality, a certain delivery service, the Postal Service's subsidiary, picks up and delivers the out-district ballots. Most of the delivery men/women of this subsidiary are not regular employees but independent contractors.

strong possibility that this server-grade BCM's have the functionality of real-time decoding of the QR data. And since this value is unique, theoretically, it is not impossible to find out "who you vote for" once the UEV ballot issuing log is secured,

It is noteworthy that S. Korea uses a very accurate and mandatory Resident Registration(RR) which involves full finger printing of all citizens older than 18 years. Since S. Korea has suffered existential security threat by North Korea, Soviet Russia and Communist China for the last 75 years, the RR does not invoke any serious opposition. The UEV uses this RR data as 'Integrated Nation-wide Voter List'(IVL).

In short, the S. Korean UEV system can be categorized as a 'Masqueraded Kiosk Network' (MKN). UEV polling places are manned and use paper ballots; thus, they provide the false appearance as if the UEV were a 'real' voting. However, the UEV is essentially a kiosk network all across the nation, totally run and controlled by the NEC's central servers. As in the case of kiosks, people can just simply drop in any one of the kiosks (the UEV polling places). The only two differences between a kiosk and a UEV polling place are: the latter is manned (instead of 'unmanned') and uses paper-ballots (instead of 'computer touch screen'). One of the side effects of the MKN-based UEV is millions of ballots shuffling all across the country and being stored in not-at-all-transparent premises for 5 to 6 days, making impossible the transparent human witnessing .

The worst consequence of the masquerading is that there is no legal binding for thorough cyber security auditing on the UEV system since people, including legislators, tend to perceive it as a simple and natural extension of the in-person Election Day voting and that the fatal danger of this system evades any meaningful attention

The UEV is not controlled by any effective/robust check-and-balance. It presupposes the NEC's and the administration's good will, integrity and expertise. However, once compromised by pro-China or pro-North Korea elements, the whole system degenerates into a 'devil's tool'; a powerful digital device for totalitarian mock-election.

This danger is further aggravated by the QR and BCM. Theoretically it is not impossible to stage a perfect crime: 1) monitor the ballot counting process in real time, 2) 'manufacture' false voters by changing the server log from 'non-voter' into 'voter', and 3) add fabricated ballots while the UEV ones are stored for 5 to 6 days.

For the last Congress Election, the NEC firewalled their central servers with Hwawei's network equipment. And it operated them not in the premises of the Government Central Computing Center (GCCC)³, which is the usual convention, but in the NEC office; in short, the servers were extremely vulnerable to intervention/manipulation from outside, especially from China.

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Executive Summary

A strong suspicion is growing on the rigging of the last Congress Election of S. Korea. Specifically the heavily digitized UEV(Universal Early Voting) needs to be studied. If rigged, it should have involved any combination of:

- 1) Hwawei network firewall equipment.
- 2) QR tampering (QR with a unique identifier is printed on every UEV ballot which is scanned and stored in USBs)
- 3) the NEC server
- 4) the BMC
- 5) adding fraudulent ballots to the UEV
- 6) Strong back-up from the CCP or any Chinese element

And S. Korea recently has provided the election system with ODA(Official Development Assistance) financing to multiple geopolitically very sensitive countries like Iraq, Congo and Bolivia, most of them are suffering from election rigging issue involving S. Korean election system.

Rigged or not, the heavily digitized S. Korean UEV system innately nullifies any meaningful human witnessing. There is no check-and-balance. The system presupposes the infallibility and the absolute good will of the NEC The combination of the NEC server, the QR, the Hwawei equipment and the BCM's has become deified; anyone, for example Bangmo Park, one of the authors of this report, who criticizes them risks being charged with instigating election crimes and infringing upon fellow citizen's freedom of voting.

To develop awareness on this new type of threat from totally digitized elections is very critical to the survival and prosperity of the civilization which has been and is to be led by the Free World. And considering the political topology of S. Korea, which is heavily polluted by pro-North Korea and pro-China quasi-totalitarian elements (even the conventional establishment which used be characterized by strong anti-communism and patriotism is heavily infiltrated), a strategic partnership between the Korean and American intellectuals across the Pacific is very important:

- 1) American people can develop 'immunity' by knowing what embarrassing and fatal consequences can happen once they naively trust those technological convenience which are being controlled by the CCP and its puppets.
- 2) Korean people can realize that their concern is not totally absurd and paranoid as is being brainwashed by the cascading narratives by almost every influential figure(including the so-called 'conservative' big media people and the leaders of the opposition party)


Global awareness campaign led by US-ROK free citizens is vital.

Very Strange Statistics

It all started with statistics. South Korea is a rich country with 30 year history of civil democracy. Any suspicion of large scale election rigging involving NEC servers and BCM's sounds like a weird conspiracy theory. But statistics are tough.

Since much more people in 2020(40% of the total) chose to vote by UEV than in 2016, the gap between the UEV and the Election Day polling rates(PR) of a candidate should be smaller and the shape of distribution of this gap across candidates more streamlined into a bell or a mountain. But it is not the case with the 2020 Congress Election:

- 1) In 2020, on average, a ruling party candidate's PR in UEV is 11% point higher than that in the Election Day. By contrast, it was only 2% higher in 2016 Congress Election. Vice versa, in 2020, on average, an opposition party candidate's PR in UEV is 11% point lower than that in the Election Day, while only 2% lower in 2016 Congress.
- 2) This gap of a candidate's PR's between UEV and Election Day is so much 'fixed' that the distribution shape is more like a box than a bell or mountain. For example in Seoul Area with 5.4 million votes across 424 'Dongs' (small towns), the poll pattern of each Dong is strikingly similar even though there are great differences of voter's political psychology.



Professor Walter Mebane of University of Michigan, a prominent American expert on election rigging, said with regard to this strange statistics:

- (1) A massive election rigging is suspected.
- (2) The UEV is the part where the rigging possibly happened.
- (3) The rigging apparently happened regardless of districts, even where the opposition candidates won.
- (4) The size of the false votes (either 'manufactured' or 'stolen') seems to be 7.26% of all ballots. If counted only for those districts won by the ruling party's candidates, 10.43%.

'Manufactured' means 'purely fabricated'. 'Stolen' means 'intentionally deducted' from an opposition candidate and 'added' into the ruling party one.

(5) The above statements are only statistical inferring. They are not conclusive proof.

25 candidates of the opposition party applied for court-ordered recounting. Numerous legal accusations are filed. Usually the court start processing the applications or legal accusations within three months after the election, which is the middle of July. However, as of August $10^{\rm th}$, not one single district is vote-recounted or under investigation.

Suspicious Episodes

There are many suspicious episodes about UEV. Following are only several among them:

1) Unfolded ballots

More than usually people put the ballots folded into the ballot box (for 'in-district') or the return envelope(for 'out-district'). But there are districts where a whole bundle of unfolded ballots are found; and every one of them are for the ruling party.



2) Multi-leaf ballots

It is impossible that two ballots stick together and form 'multi-leaf ballots'. But there are cases where this 'impossible' happened.



3) Out-of-line printing

The UEV ballots are printed from a special machine using roll paper. So out-of-line printing impossible.



4) Impossible average speed

There are 20 UEV polling places where the average in-district voting speed for two UEV days is less than 10 seconds. Since out-district voters also visit the UEV polling places, if calibrated by the ration And If we presume a ratio of 1:10 between low and peak, the highest speed is apparently far less than 1 second for these 20 polling places. There is even a case where the two day average in-district

speed is just 4.7 seconds, with the apparent maximum speed is 0.47 second for in-district voters and 0.376 second for both ins and outs.

	Average Voting Speed per Person (AVSP)			
AVSP	In-District UEV		Election-Day Voting	
	# of Polling Places	Percentage	# of Polling Palces	Percentage
less than 5 Sec's	1	0		
5 to 10 Sec's	19	0.5		
10 to 15 Sec's	179	5.1	24	0.2
15 to 20 Sec's	423	12.2	707	4.9
20 to 30 Sec's	756	21.7	4,473	31.2
30 to 40 Sec's	423	12.2	3,052	21.3
40 to 50 Sec's	232	6.7	1,638	11.4
50 to 60 Sec's	186	5.3	947	6.6
60 to 120 Sec's	729	20.9	2.392	16.7
more than 120 Sec's	532	15.3	1,086	7.6
Total	3,480	100	14,319	100

5) Impossible delivery speed

The law designates the Postal Service to pick up out-district ballots form thousands of UEV polling places, and to deliver them to the NEC branches (over 250 all over the country). However, in reality, a delivery service, many of whose delivery men are just contracted independent truckers, did the job for the 2020 election. And the delivery log is a joke: for example, only 5 minutes for 13.1 kilometer course, one for 7.2 and another one for 32.7. In short, there is possibility that the whole delivery system was compromised.

QR

The law says the UEV ballot shall:

- 1) carry a numeric identifier represented with a 'bar code (a series of elongated rectangulars)'
- 2) the unique part of the identifier (which contains the unique information) be on the bottom corner of the ballot and cut out when the ballot is handed over to the voter.

The former is explicitly stated in the law; the latter is clearly inferred from the law, given the conventional in-person Election Day ballots where the unique part is written on the bottom left corner which is meant to be cut out.

However, the NEC is using QR's. The supreme court under this administration decided in 2017 that the NEC can use QRs 'since they are two dimensional barcodes.' the NEC refuses to configure this 'to-be-cut-out' part. The result is that the ballot, after voting, still carries the unique identifier on it, making a criminal element capable of finding out who voted for whom.

Also a bar code carries numeric numbers at the bottom as defined by the standard. Thus the observer can understand the meaning. However, since a QR does not have this numeric part, there is nothing much left to observe for the observer.

And unlike the bar code, the QR can have a hidden layer carrying encrypted information. And if there is a hidden layer carrying all of the most important personal information, a criminal element can hijack the most 'valuable' information for manipulating people's socio-political psychology as well as elections.

It is noteworthy that as is shown later, a BCM scans every ballot and stores the data in a USB. The government has secured means to monitor each citizen's election behavior as well as stage a 'smart, digital' mock election.



Almighty Ballot Counting Machines

Korea has used electronic BCM. Its intelligence should be fairly simple with limited functionalities: checking the 'checked' box. (Each candidate's name has a box where a voter presses a stamp with 9 mm diameter.)

In recent years, the BCM gets more and more complicated and its intelligence level has reached that of a high-end server. The BCM image-scans every ballot and stores the data, can decode the full QR

in real time and can interoperate with the central or a criminal's server. This is a great threat to democracy:

- 1) Since the ballot carries the unique identifier, once is secured the log data of who gets what value of the identifier, the criminal element can find out who voted for whom.
- 2) Since the BCM has such high level of intelligence and connectivity, once the central server is hijacked by a criminal element, it can do any horrible thing such as 'stealing' (moving a ballot from one candidate to another) and this manipulation can be fine-tuned by real time tele-monitoring.

Any combination of server hacking via the Hwawei network security equipment, BCM manipulation, QR code tampering and fraudulent ballot adding is suspected in the last Congress Election.



The voting stamp. A standalone machine with a modest level of intelligence, not a server-grade one, is more than enough to find out the positional co-ordinates of this stamp on a ballot.

China Connection and the Personal, Private Big Data

The key figure behind the 2020 Congress Election is Yang Jung-chul, ⁴ the head of 'The Institute of Democracy'⁵, the policy and election think tank of the ruling party. Yang was the head of a heavily pro-North Korean student organization, 'Struggle Committee for Anti-American, Independence, Anti-fascist, Democratization'⁶ of 'Hankuk University of Foreign Studies'⁷ in late 1980's. Yang is known to work closely with Ko Han-seok⁸, who is known as 'an expert of collecting, analyzing and

⁴ Yang, who orchestrated the election campaign of the ruling party, abruptly announced 'retirement from politics', saying that the big victory of the election is 'scaring' and that he is .'terrified'.

⁵ In Korean, '민주연구원'

⁶ In Korean, '반미자주화반파쇼민주화투쟁위원회'(자민투)

⁷ In Korean, 한국외국어대학교

⁸ In 1992, when Ko was about to be released from the prison, he was caught carrying in his anus capsules containing secret messages from the imprisoned boss of the spy ring to other members at loose. Also he was the Chief of Staff of the leftist Seoul mayor Park Won-Soon who committed a mysterious suicide in last July. Ko is the last person who met Park.

utilizing' of demographic big data and who was a vice head of the Institue for Democracy. Ko was a North Korean spy ring⁹ member.

In July 2019, Yang visited Beijing to strike a deal with CCP on much publicized 'policy cooperation between China and S. Korea'. The timing was bizaare because by that time, it had become clear that the US is bound to win in the US-China 'war' and that the Moon administration needed to mend the already much-strained relationship with the US. What is the hidden and real purpose of this apparent self-destructive gesture by Moon administration is still a mystery.

The ruling party, under the leadership of Yang, amassed micro-geographic information, consisting of nine elements: gender, age, residential area, household composition, marital status, housing space, residential type, living arrangement, and academic background. This type of data is subject to the Personal Information Protection Act. There is an anxiety on whether the ruling party has been amassing this data with personal consent, If not, the ruling Democratic Party have been systematically violating basic personal rights.

Yang is said to gather this data from the local governments and KT(the largest wired and mobile telco). Also Yang met the head of KCIA, the Korean equivalent of FBI AND CIA, which is strictly forbidden by law. There is a rumor that Yang handed over this data to a big Chinese company which is controlled by the CCP.

BCM, ATM and Hwawei

Some Korean corporates have very close relationship with China, directly or indirectly. And at the same time, they sometimes do a most critical business in the US. This is exactly the case with Hantle, the sole provider of BCMs to the NEC.

On the one hand, Hantle has long enjoyed strategic partnership with Chongho Comnet which is one of the closest Korean partners of Hwawei. On the other hand, Hantle is one of the most strategic partners of Tranax Technologies (a Korean US company) which has the largest share of American ATM(Automatic Teller Machine for personal banking) market. Tranax is also closely related with another Korean company Hyosung, which is one of the most powerful reseller of Hwawei network equipment and servers in Korean market.

Thus if there is a rigging in the Congress Election and if Hantle's BCM's are proved to be involved, then the US needs to have a very keen eye on any possibility of the tens of thousands of ATM's installed on the American soil compromised.

Korean election system (the server and the BCM) is 'given' to several developing countries including Congo, Iraq and Bolivia. The CCP have tried very hard to infiltrate them and sometimes with a shocking success as is the case with the last Iraqi government which was under heavy influence of Iran, the strategic partner of the CCP in the Middle East.

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⁹ In Korean, 중부지역당

Korean government have provided the election system via ODA(Official Development Assistance) financing. And most of the countries which received this 'aid' and the system are suffering from election rigging issue. If this suspicion ever happens to be true, it means that S. Korean election system has become a tool for staging mock-elections which perpetuate rotten, oppressive pro-china puppet regimes in developing countries, many of which are suffering from the debt-trap of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Legal and Constitutional Issues

There are fundamental issues with the UEV, whether it is rigged or not:

1) Equal value of ballots

The law allows only 14 days for Congress Election campaign. And the UEV is held 4 to 5 days before. Thus the UEV shortens the campaign by around one third. This significantly impairs the right of a voter to get informed on the candidates. Furthermore, if something very serious happens during this 4 to 5 days, many of the UEV voter end up with choosing somebody whom he/she would not vote for if he/she voted on the Election Day. When the early voting is restricted only to absentees, this minus effect is inevitable; however, when 40% (and it goes up and up) of voters choose the UEV, this effect of time-lapse critically impairs the equal value of ballots.

2) Pride of a citizen

In Korea, the Election Day is special holiday. Voting on that day is supposed to be a festival where each person expresses his/her will as a member of the citizenry. But with the UEV, the Election Day is being degraded into a day for leisure. The UEV makes a joke out of a citizen's pride and responsibility.

How to Overcome Marginalization

The pro-North, pro-China Korea faction is now controlling administration, congress and evern court. They have long dominated universities and media by developing strong bonds with post-modernist deconstructivism, feminism, LGBT and PC(political correctness) left. And there is heavy infiltration by China and North Korea. We can justly call the current system as a quasi-totalitarian regime.

The court and public attorneys are virtually sabotaging any investigation of the suspected election rigging. The opposition party is completely silenced. The big media is rather hostile toward raising the question of election rigging. The fundamental problem with S. Korea is that the establishment, which is supposed to be conservative and anti-China is completely disoriented just like American Democrats. In short, those who suspects the quasi-totalitarian regime of massive election rigging are being marginalized as 'conspiracy theorists' or even as paranoids.

Still there are brave souls. 25 candidates applied for recounting. Prominent scholars are pointing at the statistic anomaly. Elite lawyers are risking their professional career by bravely holding up the issue of election rigging. Grass root researchers are piling up direct and indirect proofs. People are making demonstrations.

What is needed is a virtuous circle of awareness between the American people and the Korean. Korean resistance contributes to the American people's alertness against this new type of threat.

The American people can find some valuable lessons:

- 1) If people loses vigilance, foreign intervention (infiltration by the CCP or a third country's corporate proxy of the CCP) can ruin the US election system into a total mess.
- 2) If legislators lose perspective, they can end up with very monstrous and ominous election system.
- 3) If digital technology is not fully audited and scrutinized, it will be used as a devil's device for high tech Orwellian rule.

And as the American awareness increases, the Korean people will be greatly encouraged and come out with more effective struggle/resistance which will provide inspirations to all the people on this globe.

Conclusion

If the suspicion stated in this report is true, there follows very serious conclusions:

- 1) The Korean society as a whole, including the big media and the opposition party, is heavily infiltrated by the CCP and the north-Korea. There are some brave souls fighting against the quasi-totalitarian regime; but the alternative leadership is not strong even though a wide spread disillusionment among the grass roots is growing very fast.
- 2) However, since Korea is so closely intertwined with the global market and the socio-political thinking of the Free World, as the US and the Western European countries overcome 'China-love' and deconstructivism (the Post-Modernist PC Left), in the log term, the Korean people can surely overcome their 'sick' politics.
- 3) Still, if there is a quantum geo-politic change with regard to the West Pacific and especially the Korean peninsula, a total psychological and behavioral change will take place in the Korean people's politics. The reason is that the current 'illness' has its roots in the following context:
 - (a) The 30 year old Korea-China honeymoon is the key factor for the pro-China, pro-North quasi-totalitarianism.
 - (b) The 50 year old degeneration of the American culture and spirit (the deconstructivism which has swept the US academia, the media, and the intellectuals) has been 'imported' and strengthened. (Deconstructivism, the 'reckless passion', as Lionel Trilling puts it, is now being overcome in the US and the Western Europe.)
 - (c) Korean intellectuals were naïve and unguarded. (As is clear with the 6,200 member-strong 'Professors Solidarity', one of the five organizers of this Conference, the Korean intellectuals are undergoing the 'Great Awakening'.)

Meanwhile, whether there was a rigging or not, rigging is true, we can draw some valuable lessons:

- 1) Do NOT digitize the election, especially when the configuration and scenario nullifies human insight and witness. Especially when there is a danger the CCP can utilize this high=tech myth, and when a strong pro-China infiltration takes hold of the power elites, a heavily digitized election will surely lead to a total disaster.
- 2) Do NOT make the election process complicated. What is simple is both elegant and powerful.
- 3) Do NOT buy the false argument for 'the maximization of the voter convenience'. Convenience only makes the election a joke or an embarrassment. Voters who are not alert enough to overcome the minimum level of inconvenience is not qualified to take part in the election.

Now the US is strengthening the socio-political culture domestically and changing the global strategy internationally toward a reciprocal network of value-based sovereign states. And the whole Korean peninsula is facing the emergence of a totally new geo-political horizon. "How can a free citizenry operate a honest and transparent election?"—there is few issue more critical and interesting for our two people.

Abbreviations and Terminology

- UEV: universal early voting, '사전투표(관내, 관외)'
- Absentee Voting: '사전투표(부재자, 즉 居所, 船上, 在外)
- Election Day, a special holiday for voting (선거일, 임시공휴일로 지정됨)
- Two (consecutive) UEV days (이틀에 걸친 사전투표일)
- In-district UEV: 관내사전투표
- Out-district UEV: 관외사전투표
- NEC: National Election Committee, 중앙선관위
- NEC branch: NEC Local Branch, 지방선관위
- BCM: Ballot Counting Machines, 전자개표기
- RR: Resident Registration, 주민등록
- MKN: masqueraded kiosk network, 본투표소 느낌으로 위장된 키오스크 네트워크 (사전투표소를 가리킴)

- GCCC: Government Central Computing Center. The legal name is 'NCIS'(National Computing and Information Services), (광주)정부통합전산센터
- PR: Polling Rate