This article was originally published on the Providence Magazine.
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin recently spoke by phone for the second time since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. After the call, each government issued its own statement which display how each government’s strategic goals have changed as the war progresses. In its statement, Russia raised the “historically unprecedented” nature of the current Sino-Russian relationship, while Xi cheered the “legality of Russia’s special military operation.” Without question, Putin hopes to hitch his chariot to Xi as Russia remains stuck in the Ukraine mire by obtaining meaningful military and economic support from China. As for China, its statement eschewed such pointed language, expressing instead only tactful verbal support. Xi has always tried to benefit from the war here and now while at the same time laying a strategic foundation for the achievement of his country’s long-term ambitions. This has become more difficult from Xi Jinping’s point of view, given the war’s expansion in the face of strong opposition from much of the world. So how can China still gain from the conflict without becoming another target of such opposition?
Without question, among these ambitions is the conquest of Taiwan. On June 12, the Chinese defense minister Wei Fenghe emphasized that if there are those who “dare to split off Taiwan,” China “does not fear war,” nor does it “fear paying the necessary price.” He added that the US emphasis on its multilateral Indo-Pacific partnership arrangements is designed to “back China into a corner.” His wording of being backed into a corner echoed other Chinese language with respect to Russia being forced by Western expansionism to invade Ukraine. On June 13, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said that China has sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait and the concept of so-called “international waters” does not exist in the international law of the sea. This is obviously an attempt to strengthen the legitimacy from the perspective of international law of any Chinese military unification of Taiwan.
If these remarks indicate that Xi Jinping, given that his determination to retake Taiwan by force, is preparing public opinion for this outcome, it is reasonable to ask what he has learned from the Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been going on for more than three months.
From Xi Jinping’s perspective, the key task is to achieve what Putin failed to achieve — a successful decapitating first assault. Russia’s failure in this regard, driven by Ukrainians’ indomitable willingness to fight to save their country, will cause Xi to consider that Taiwanese may be similarly willing to defend their own country against a Chinese invasion. While China has absolute military superiority over Taiwan, Taiwan has the geographic advantage of 100 miles of separation provided by the Taiwan Strait, along with the availability of its central mountains as a redoubt. It also has numerous advanced fighter planes and missiles. This means that Taiwan need only successfully resist the first wave to then be able to benefit from extensive Western assistance. Thus, if the initial assault fails to conquer the island, China too will be drawn into a quagmire, and face economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and domestic turmoil at least as bad as, and possibly more severe than, that now faced by Russia, weakening Xi domestically.
What Xi should learn from the war is that conquering Taiwan will be far more difficult than he has imagined. He needs to be better prepared in the political, economic, military, social and diplomatic spheres. There are signs that he has already learned this to some extent, and is acting accordingly to prepare for what he will face in terms of external sanctions and any internal political crisis that might follow the launch of an invasion. He is preparing to increase his ability to play the long game with the democratic world in six important regards:
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