With the Focus on the Issue of Mailing Outside-Jurisdiction Early Voting Ballots to the Post Office
1. On This Topic
The original purpose of the early-voting system was for absentee voters, but it has now gone beyond its original intent, and the system is now being abused. Especially, there are many “loopholes in the outside-jurisdiction early voting system”, so I would like to describe it by focusing on the problem.
This study is to examine the problems of early-voting by focusing on the issues of 1) the early voting ballot “paper” (material problem); 2) the problems raised in the inside-jurisdiction and outside-jurisdiction voting (substantial problem); 3) and the ‘management’ of the early voting system (operation problem); and after examining this area, this study will examine the current 4) possible scenario for manipulation; and finally 5) the situation of the destruction of evidence.
1.1 The Definition of Early Voting
Early voting (or, advance voting)[1] is a system whereby a voter can vote during the early voting period without going through a separate registration or notification of authorities, to cast a vote in any ‘eup’, ‘myeon’, or ‘dong’ level voting areas, in the early voting booth locations. This system was enacted in 2013 to increase the voters’ participation by reforming the voters’ voting rights; it was first carried out in the latter half of 2013 in the by-elections, and in 2014, during the 6th national simultaneous local elections, thus it was carried out nationwide in South Korea.
1.2 Distinguishing between Outside-and-Inside Jurisdiction Early Voting
The early voting system is distinguished by inside-jurisdiction voting, and outside-jurisdiction voting [2] and accordingly, the voting method is different between the two. Inside-jurisdiction voting is for voters who have their residence address in the relevant ‘gu’, ‘shi’, or ‘gun’ voting district. Outside-jurisdiction voting is for voters who have addresses outside the voting district.
The practical benefit of the distinction between the two types of jurisdictional voting is first of all, the difference in how the votes are stored. For the inside-jurisdiction early voting ballot papers, the ballots are stored and sealed in the ballot box and under the watchful eye of the police and/or civil servants, the boxes are then transported to each ‘shi’, ‘gun’, or ‘gu’ district’s NEC office, and stored in locations with closed circuit security cameras. On the other hand, the outside-jurisdiction early voting ballot papers are put in mailing envelopes and sent via mail using the postal service to each district’s NEC office. Especially for the outside-jurisdiction ballot papers, they are stored in locations without security cameras, and with weak security, and so there are many problems associated with this, which we will cover later.
2. The Problem with the Early Voting Ballot ‘Paper’ (Material Problem)
2.1 Revised and Enforced – The Public Official Election Act – January 17, 2014
As seen in Articles 11, 38, and 151 of the Public Official Election Act, the early voting system was put into effect as law, and a new regulation regarding bar codes was included. [3] The barcodes contain the serial number of the ballot paper, and it is stipulated that the barcode is printed on the early voting ballot paper, not on the envelope for mailing. This barcode contains only the following information – the election name, the election voting district, and the relevant NEC office information.
2.2 The Difference between a Barcode and a QR Code
A basic barcode basically has horizontal lines whereby up to 20-spaces of numbered information can be included, thus, a one-dimensional format. Compared to this, a QR code can use both the horizontal and vertical axes and up to 7,089 numbers, or 4,296 letters, and 1,817 Chinese pictographs, can be included, thus it is a two-dimensional format. That is, a barcode can only contain a product name or the manufacturer’s name, but a QR code can contain a longform Internet address (URL) and also photo and video information, map information, or a business card information.[4]
2.3 The Reason for Using QR Codes on the Early Voting Ballot Papers, In Violation of Regulations
The Public Official Election Act only stipulates the usage of barcodes and does not mention ‘QR codes’ at all in the Act. Despite that, we must think, “Why the National Election Commission (NEC) used QR codes?”, and we can come up with the following reasons:[5]
(1) The need to contain a lot of information.
(2) The need for the current administration, which is seeking a pro-China policy, to insert QR codes with ‘hanja’ (Chinese pictograph) information.
(3) The need for steganographic methods in the QR code images.
– Steganographic technology is one way to hide data, and involves hiding data within other data, or research thereof. [6]
– Many security experts have warned about the dangers of steganography.
– Osama bin Laden and his associates were known to use messaging techniques that used steganography during the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
– Steganography also allows for hiding the transmission of data, so it is different from encryption. [7]
– Using steganography allows a cyber spy and attacker to stay hidden and undetected for a long time within a system. [8]
2.4 Dr. Richard DeMillo of Georgia Tech.[9]
Dr. DeMillo of Georgia Tech has expressed grave concerns regarding the fraudulent elections held in South Korea. His opinions can be described as follows:
2.4.1 The Problems with QR Codes
① A human being cannot read a QR code.
② When a ballot paper is scanned, what kind of information is contained in the QR code is unknown.
③ A QR code scanner is prone to easy hacking.
2.4.2 Dr. Richard DeMillo’s Thesis
① Thesis Title: Ballot-Marking Device(BMDs) Cannot Assure the Will of the Voters
② Thesis Co-Authors
– Andrew W. Appel / Princeton University
– Philip. B. Stark / Univ. of California, Berkeley
③ Thesis Content
ⅰ) The purpose of the paper is to call for the strict regulation of the composition of voting machines for electronic voting
ⅱ) The safest method of voting is using paper ballots, not electronic voting machines.
ⅲ) Electronic voting machines can be easily hacked, and can be verified by hand counting the ballots. (As long as the ballot box is safely secured, hand counting is effective)
ⅳ) Even if paper ballots are used instead of electronic voting machines, if the ballot sorters and the counters are connected to the Internet, hacking can occur any time.
ⅴ) When foreign-made parts are used, hidden malware can be inside the parts with backdoors installed.
3. The Problems that Arise from Outside-and-Inside-Jurisdiction Voting (Substantial Problem)
Early voting is divided into outside and inside jurisdiction voting – 1) “outside” is the problem whereby the early voting ballot papers are delivered to the post office; 2) “inside” is the problem of ‘supervision of the ballot box’. We will discuss both problems.
3.1 The Problem with Outside Jurisdiction Early Voting
3.1.2 The Problem with the ‘Return/Mailing Envelope’ in Outside Jurisdiction Early Voting.
There is the issue of the adhesive on the ‘return/mailing envelope’ that is very weak, so that when the envelope is closed and opened, the paper is not damaged and cleanly attaches and detaches. If it gets too sticky, applying heat can open the envelope. This signifies that if the contents are switched inside the envelope, this can be very easily accomplished
3.1.3 The Problem of the ‘Mail Delivery’ of the Return/Mailing Envelope
“After the close of early voting, the return envelopes containing the ballots where transferred to the post office under the supervision of the police and the election official, but someone witnessed the NEC official taking that envelope and working on it. During the process of bringing back the envelope, there was no election official or monitor, and no police was present either. Everything was just delivered as if they were normal delivery items. Normally, I thought that these ballot papers with seals on them would be delivered to the relevant NEC offices under tight security, but what I saw was unbelievable. It is highly suspect what was done to the envelopes in that closed off office space. I suspect there must have been a switching of votes and other abnormal activities. Furthermore, the abnormal activities were done from Saturday night to the following day, staying up all night, with the computer printer running all day, and garbage bags filled with shredded paper being thrown out 2 or 3 bags at a time at a similar time from the NEC offices, and so there were many suspicious activities. From a regular citizen’s point of view, these things are extremely hard to accept or understand, and the NEC officials can’t be trusted.” It can be said that the citizens’ right to know has been interfered with through total control.[10]
3.1.4 The Problem with the Outside-Jurisdiction Early Voting’s Ballot Box Storage ‘Location’
There are no security cameras in the outside-jurisdiction early voting ballot paper storage locations. These places are not even locked up. During the annual National Assembly auditing hearings, this issue was raised, and the NEC said that “everyday the ballot papers are delivered two to three times a day, and in the case that the ballot boxes are opened and closed many times and caught on camera, this can cause other misunderstanding.” Many voters fear the switching of votes with the ballot boxes, but according to the NEC officials, each political party’s monitors can visit and monitor, so the situation has no problems at all.[11]
3.1.5 A Specific Instance
“At the Daejon city, Jung-Gu NEC vote counting office, among the ballot papers there was one bunch of ballot papers from Sejong City, and another one bunch of ballot papers from Gongju City; when the monitor was notified of this, the NEC official snatched the batches of ballot papers and the naïve ballot counters got the help of the local administrative office workers to find the Sejong City and Gongju City envelopes containing the early voting ballot papers, but they ended up not being able to find anything. Afterwards, those votes were known to be treated as invalidated votes, but how are we to explain this? I surmise that this was a mistake that occurred during the process of switching of votes, but what do you all think? If there is an NEC official who can provide an explanation, please do so!”[12]
3.2 The Problem with the Inside-Jurisdiction Early Voting
3.2.1 The Problem of Mismanagement of Supervision of Inside-Jurisdiction Early Voting Ballot Paper Storage Box
The NEC has stated that the storage room/facilities where the inside-jurisdiction early voting ballot boxes are stored have security cameras, and anytime a request is made, the security tape can be viewed, and this is how they promoted the openness of the management of the early voting system. However, communications and IT experts have stated that even security camera footage can be fully manipulated.
According to a whistleblower form the Dongjak NEC office, a log-in record showed that the screen was fixed in one position, and the connection to the camera was disconnected. If it were not for this information, everyone would have been completely fooled. And there are stories that the fee to apply for viewing the security camera footage is exorbitantly high, prevent regular citizens from easily approaching the issue. Considering these points, it is highly suspicious regarding what happened in the NEC offices throughout the country.
4. The Problem with the ‘Management’ of the Early Votes (Problems with Running the System)
4.1 The Lax Self-Identification Process
Accepting a student ID card as a substitute for a national registration card is dangerous, because Chinese and international students in South Korea may maximize the abuse of the student ID card, and they have to check their identity with the face mask off, but some polling stations have followed this regulation closely.
4.2 The Problem with the Seal
After the vote is taken, the inside-jurisdiction ballot box seal and the seal on the computerized equipment have vinyl material seals affixed, but these seals do not leave a mark when taken off, so if a fake seal with a counterfeit signature is applied, no one will know the difference. In addition, even if the observer signs it, there is a problem that it is only a formality because the observer practically is never there to check and monitor who signs the seal when it is opened or when it is sealed off.
4.3 The Absence of a Stamp/Seal of Confirmation by The NEC’s Administrative Officer (The Problem of the Violation of Election Law)
Article 158, Chapter 3 of the Public Official Election Act lists the procedure for: “The official in charge of advance polling management shall print ballot papers for the relevant election with a ballot paper printer, affix his/her seal on the blank for “official in charge of advance polling management”, and give a ballot paper to an elector without cutting off the serial number, along with an envelope for return.” However, the stamp was printed and distributed on the ballot, of the supervisor – thus violating election law.[13]
4.4 The Case of the Discovery of the Damaged Ballot Box at the Daejon Dong-Gu NEC Vote Counting Office [14]
This case was one discovered by the vote counting monitor from the Christian Liberty Unification Party, at the Daejon Dong-Gu NEC’s vote counting office, named Kim XX. This monitor witnessed ballot boxes being sent into the office after voting ended, and the Pam-am 2-dong ballot boxes were severely damaged, and upon further, closer inspection, there was evidence of the seal having been adhered and then taken off, and the locking mechanism on the box was off, that is, the pin was removed so that the lid was in an open position; after all these were confirmed with an NEC official, they too determined that it was a serious situation.
In addition, the Pan-am 1-dong, and Gayang-dong ballot boxes also had traces of the seal having been affixed and taken off. The monitor, Kim XX videotaped the situation to preserve as evidence, and afterwards the NEC counted these problem ballot boxes together with other ballot boxes, according to the monitor.
We consider this a serious breach and raise this as an issue regarding the NEC solution. This situation clearly shows that someone touched the ballot boxes and committed an act that violated the fairness of the elections, and if the NEC is not complicit in this, they should have proactively sought out the police and try to find the criminal, and the common sense thing would be for them to secure the problem ballot boxes as evidence, but the NEC has just buried the issue and has moved on, causing many to wonder about the identity of the NEC, and we declare that the ballot counting for the Dong-gu District of Daejeon is invalid.
4.5 The Early Voting Results from Bongdam-Eup Disappears[15]
There was truly something strange that happened at the Bongdam-eup voting location, which is a combination of the Hwasungjae 1 and 2 voting locations (Bongdam-eup was originally in the Hwasungbyung voting district, and in early March, it was redistricted to the Hwasunggap voting district.) According to the NEC data, the entire Bongdam-eup inside-jurisdiction early voting results disappeared. The NEC data collected the Hwasung city’s entire inside-jurisdiction early voting tally as 8,665 votes (from 18 voting locations). Meaning, 8,665 people voted. However, the inside-jurisdiction early voting numbers for Hwhsungbyung, which excludes Bongdam-eup, has the same number of inside-jurisdiction early voters, at 8,665 votes. The Bongdam-eup early voting results just totally disappeared.
4.6 Other Problems.
In addition to the above-mentioned problems, there were also problems with: 1) the discovery of destroyed, mutilated ballot related materials at the Namyangju incineration plant; 2) the seals were different for the early voting and the day of the ballot counting; 3) mutilated/damaged seals and ballot papers that were stiff like brand new currency; 4) problems with damaged/defaced ballot boxes, seals and ballot papers holding boxes, etc.[16]
5. A Possible Scenario for Manipulation
5.1 Possibility of Offline Operational Manipulation
5.1.1 Category
– Piling up of votes.
5.1.2 Direct Evidence
① The discovery of ballot papers during counting, where the ballot papers were connected from the top and bottom together.
② In this case, this type of occurrence happens when the ballot papers are printed in large quantities.[17]
5.1.3 Circumstantial Evidence
① The outside-jurisdictional early voting ballots were not even sealed up.
② Ballots were delivered in baskets without lids to post offices.
③ Ballot papers left for days without being monitored.
④ Disturbed/broken seals on ballot boxes.
⑤ Ballot boxes stored in a health gym.
⑥ Ballot papers with more votes than actual number of voters.
– In the NEC office of the Jeonju City, Wansan-Gu district, 10 more ballots were counted than the actual number of voters.[18]
⑦ The ballot counting official was a Chinese citizen.
⑧ During the process of cleaning up of trash in the vote counting office, the articles that came out were not related to election day materials, but the materials were from an early voting polling place. [19]
5.2 The Possibility of Online Manipulation and Fraud
5.2.1 Category
① Stealing of votes (plagiarizing of votes)
② Switching of votes.
– Given that the same phenomenon has occurred nationwide, the “20% vote-taking formula” seems to have been used.[20]
6. The Destruction of Evidence in Progress.[21]
6.1 Fires That Broke Out After the General Elections
After the general elections, the following were cases of fires that broke out centered on logistics warehouses and waste disposal sites across the country.
– 4. 16. Seongju recycling business fire.
– 4. 21. Busan, Daejuh-dong logistics warehouse fire.
– 4. 21. Gyeonggi Province Gunpo logistics warehouse fire.
– 4. 23. Anseong, Juksan-myeon recycling business fire.
– 4. 28. Yichun, Seolsung-myeon junkyard fire.
– 4. 29. Gyeonggi Province, Hwasung junkyard and Yichung logistics warehouse fires.
– 4. 30. Gyeongnam, Kimhae junkyard fire.
– 4. 30. Gyeongnam, Hamam-gun wastepaper facility fire.
– 5. 2. Gyeongbuk, Youngchun, Geumho-eup, junkyard fire.
– 5. 7. Kimpo junkyard fire.
– 5. 12. Goyang logistics warehouse fire.
6.2 Gunpo City Logistics Warehouse Fire
① Former National Assemblyman Min Kyung Wook presented the electronic ballot counting machines as the evidence needed to shine a light on allegations of election fraud, and has stated that these electronic ballot counting machines were stored in the Gunpo city warehouse in the F-dong block.
② The fire in the Gunpo city warehouse started in the incinerator located inside the warehouse, and then spread to the F-dong block.
6.3 SPC Samlip Brand Bread Boxes and Fraudulent Elections
① The Dobong-Gu NEC office stored ballots in Samlip corporation’s bread boxes.
② The CEO of SPC Samlip, Huh Young In, is connected to President Moon Jae In’s network.
③ The SPC Samlip’s logistical warehouse in Gunpo city is in M-dong, right next to the NEC office which is located in F-dong (‘dong’ -> neighborhood block) (The warehouse used by the NEC office is right next to the warehouse used by the SPC Samlip bakery company.)
7. Conclusion
The problems of early-voting, with the issues of 1) the early voting ballot “paper” (material problem); 2) the problems raised in the inside-jurisdiction and outside-jurisdiction voting (substantial problem); 3) and the ‘management’ of the early voting system (operation problem) have been discussed so far. The early voting system was started in order to help with absentee voting, but the system has been abused in many ways and has resulted in fraudulent elections. Like a chimney that has not been lit will not produce smoke, likewise the experts and domestic and international scholars have raised the issue of allegations of fraud in this general election held in April, and in light of this, serious consideration must be taken regarding what has happened. Especially, it is an important turning point in the settlement of the ‘Manchurian’ electoral system of this land, and it seems to be important to reveal the substantive truth in a situation where there is a problem with the transparency of the election system as a whole.
[1] Public Official Election Act, Article 148 (Establishment of Advance Polling Stations), Article 158 (Advance/Early Voting)
[2] Public Official Election Act, Article 158, Chapter 5, Rules on the Management of Public Official Election, Article 86 (Early Voting)
[3] The Public Official Election Act, Article 151 (Preparation of Ballot Papers and Boxes)
[4] http://www.hwangryong.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=2472
[5] <The Problem of the April 15 Fraudulent Elections>, Woo-Hyung Kwon, Esq., May 23, 2020
[6] https://www.dailysecu.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=60528
[7] https://www.dailysecu.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=52638
[8] Thesis by Prof. Yoo, Ki-Young, Computer Science Dept., Kyungbuk Univ., on QR codes and steganography.
[9] https://youtu.be/f697XrmA_po , [Scott Humans and Freedom Story channel]
[10] <The White Paper on the 21st General Elections of April 15> Hakmin Kim, Esq. June 6, 2020.
[11] http://news.tvchosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2020/04/11/2020041190047.html
[12] https://newstapa.org/article/OQoGq
[13] http://www.andongdaily.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=23702
[14] <April 15 Fraudulent Elections White Paper>, Free Citizen Coalition
[15] <The White Paper on the 21st General Elections of April 15> Hakmin Kim, Esq. June 6, 2020.
[16] List of allegations of fraudulent elections raised by former National Assemblyman, Min Kyung Wook. (Contents of a Press Conference) https://www.facebook.com/minkyungwook/videos/3856550791052744/
[17] https://youtu.be/JwHrpvZwpr8
[18] http://www.andongdaily.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=23569
[19] https://youtu.be/ZNzaJeT3TlE , Gong Byong Ho TV
[20] https://youtu.be/bYnUnPTcR3k , Gong Byong Ho TV
[21] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mKBzlHenV_8 , Jin Jayu TV
