Previous article: Suspicions Cloud Korean-Made Election Equipment (part1)
In the last issue, we talked about collusion among the Korean National Election Commission (NEC), the Association of World Election Bodies (A-WEB), and Miru Systems, and how they conspired to sell Korean-made election equipment to countries like the Congo and Iraq, which resulted in election fraud scandals.
The South Korean NEC’s involvement in the Congo election drew a lot of negative international attention in 2017.
According to the South Korean Ambassador to the Congo in 2017, western diplomats in the Congo opposed the Korean electronic election equipment because they regarded the equipment as corrupt. The Korean Embassy in DR Congo organized a session to show that the equipment was sound. On December 5, 2017, the diplomats gathered at the Ambassador’s residence. The diplomats and the election experts were from the US, Britain, Belgium, EU, Germany, Canada, France, and South Korea.
The A-WEB’s executive director, Kim Yong-hee, was there to explain the technology and answer the questions for the diplomats and experts, and there were many questions and concerns. The Councilor to the US Embassy stated, “This election is the first peaceful election in the history of the Congo since its independence in 1960, which makes it the most important election ever… We are concerned that the electronic system at this stage could jeopardize the entire election process. In a country with no experience with the electronic election, it is impossible to conduct an election without prior testing.”
A diplomat from the EU expressed a similar concern. “It is very inappropriate to coerce new technology on the population without prior testing.”
The Ambassador from Belgium warned, “The electronic ballot counter will turn into a cheating machine for manipulating election results.”
The Ambassador from Britain said, “A-WEB’s executive director, a Korean, recommended using a Korean manufacturer without an international bidding process. That is inappropriate. It is reasonable to suspect the Congo’s Election Commission of corruption.”
Kim Yong-hee admitted that he had “recommended the company at the request of the Congo Election Commission. But the Congo government signed the agreement with the company,” repeating that the electronic voting would enhance transparency and accuracy.
In the end, the US representatives warned the Korean contingents, “Supplying these electronic voting machines is the worst choice because they will negatively influence Korea’s image.” US Ambassador Niki Haley followed with a statement that the election should be conducted with paper ballots, adamantly opposing the use of Korean electronic machines
Whatever Kim Yong-hee was doing, his actions were not up to the standards of a sound electoral process, and he came under scrutiny. As a former Executive Director of the NEC, Kim became the Executive Director of the A-WEB in charge of securing its funding from the National Assembly and overseeing the marketing and exporting of the Korean-style voting system.
To further explain the relationship between the NEC and the A-WEB, the NEC initiated and founded A-WEB in 2013 with the National Assembly’s funding. The NEC established an ODA (Overseas Development) fund of about $6 million in 2016 to promote the “Korean Election System. ” In 2017, the NEC received about $8 million for marketing the system in countries like the Congo, Uzbekistan, Fiji, El Salvador, and Ecuador, as shown in the table below.
The A-WEB used the fund to set up electronic voting machines and the software for building the database containing electoral information, voters list, etc., at no cost to the client nations.
Following the initial introduction of the system, the client nations were supposed to acquire the equipment via open bidding. However, A-WEB bypassed the bidding process and pushed the Miru system. Moreover, Kim was involved in kick-back and bribery schemes. Election officials from Argentina and Romania faced investigation for corruption. Newspapers in El Salvador and DR Congo published stories suspecting the A-WEB and the Miru system.
The NEC was aware of these accusations in 2016, but it ignored the situation until 2018 when it decided to perform an internal audit.
An official who asked to remain anonymous corroborated the various reports originating from overseas. He said, “Receiving the budget from the NEC, the A- WEB peddles the Miru electronic machines among the developing nations by offering them free set-up. Then they help Miru monopolize the equipment supply. They have known about the corrupt practice in 2016, and we were still talking about it in 2018. This is a shameful happening for Korea.”
Still, the NEC was oblivious to the problem. Its official position on the topic was that it had been aware of installing computer servers and software in client nations at no cost. Still, it was not aware that Miru was the lone supplier of the voting equipment.
The NEC’s explanation did not sit well with the members of the National Assembly. The members of the Assembly demanded a full accounting of the funds allotted to A-WEB. At a hearing held in October 2018, Mr. Chu Seung-yong, deputy Chairman of the National Assembly, charged, “Korea has become a laughing stock in the international community for exporting election fraud. The NEC must take responsibility for the A-WEB’s corrupt practice.”
Assemblyman Chu displayed a lot of courage for criticizing the NEC. Under any circumstance, anyone holding an elected office does not dare to criticize the NEC because the NEC holds power to sway elections.
Meanwhile, Miru System insisted that its device was safe, saying, “It’s impossible to hack the electronic voting machine because it is not connected to the outside internet.”
An expert hacker, Shim Joon-bo from HARU (Hackers United), disagreed with Miru and said, “No un-hackable system exists in the world. Even if the electronic sorter is off-line, there is a way to hack the manufacturer and imbed a backdoor in the firmware. Also, there are ways to attack the network node en route to the central server.”
This is the same debate that is taking place today in 2020. Civic groups have presented a host of anomalies to the NEC about the ballot separator and counter. The NEC’s reply is the same as Miru from 2018—”It’s impossible to hack the ballot separators and counters because it is not connected to the outside internet.”
The NEC is not very convincing. Instead of offering credible explanations, it threatens the unconvinced public. It threatens them to “stop spreading the fake news, or else.”
One of the prominent challengers against the NEC is former Assemblyman Min Kyung-wook, who has filed a lawsuit to nullify the April election. As evidence of election rigging, he had presented suspicious, unused ballots. Instead of explaining the suspicious ballots, the NEC had the Prosecution Service investigate him for possession of ballots and confiscated his cell phone and car. The Prosecution Service also arrested Mr. Lee, the election-observer- turned-whistle-blower for stealing the ballots.
Former Assemblywoman Park Young-ah, a prominent physics professor with a Ph. D. in physics from the University of Pennsylvania, pointed out that “a statistical impossibility had occurred in South Korea’s 21st general election.” She likened the election to “tossing 1,000 coins at once, and with all of them landing heads-up.”
Given the NEC’s history of untoward behavior, it is time for the South Korean electorate to demand transparency from the NEC to ascertain that their votes have been accounted for properly. The people of South Korea owe to themselves peace of mind that their democracy is alive and well.
In the next issue, we will address the illegal use of QR Codes.
Source: http://www.skyedaily.com/news/news_spot.html?ID=72753
John Cha lives and writes in Oakland, California. He has written several volumes of biographies about Korean and American leaders and is an award-winning translator of Korean literature into English.
